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Abstract 
Process hazard analysis is an important step to identify risk in a process 
facility. Automation of hazard identification requires efficient search techniques 
with the aid of a knowledge base. It also requires an easy menu driven interface 
so that an ordinary user can interact with the system with minimal intervention 
from an expert. One of the models to implement automation of hazard analysis is 
HAZOP (hazard and operability) study. Fault propagation, an aspect of HAZOP 
analysis, defines the propagation of deviation among equipment in a process 
facility. To identify all the possible hazards and their faster access, it is necessary 
to develop an efficient fault propagation algorithm with a knowledge-base. The 
existing tools performing automated HAZOP analysis does not provide any 
means to identify the propagation of deviation to all downstream equipment. Also 
some of the developed tools are slower in data extraction, require an expert to 
interpret the analyzed result, focuses more on causes of deviation in a process 
facility than the consequences, and is specific to process facility structure. 
This thesis focuses on development of an expert system to perform 
automated HAZOP analysis with a unique fault propagation algorithm that will 
identify propagation of deviation to all downstream equipment in a process 
facility. Furthermore, the expert system has a knowledge base that identifies all 
general causes and consequences of equipment failure in a process facility and 
enables effective and efficient decision making tool for the user of the system. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 RISK ANALYSIS IN A PROCESS FACILITY 
Chapter!: Introduction 
Risk is defined as the probability of the occurrence of an event which is 
seen as undesirable (Holton, 2004). Process hazard analysis (PHA) is an 
important step to identify risks involved in a process facility. A process facility has 
to take into consideration human lives, expensive equipment, and the 
surrounding environment during its operation. A slight error in operation due to 
equipment failure or human error may cause serious havoc (fire, explosion, 
chemical release, etc.) in the facility. In Bhopal, India, a poisonous vapor 
discharged from a pesticide plant killed more than 2000 civilians and injured 
20,000 more on December 3rd, 1984 (Crowl & Louvar, 2001 ). A vapor cloud 
explosion in Flixborough, England caused the death of 28 people while injuring 
many in June, 197 4. A massive explosion in Pasadena, Texas resulted in 23 
fatalities and 314 injuries in October, 1989. A series of explosion at British 
Petroleum Texas City Refinery, caused the death of 15 and injuring 170 on 
March 23, 2005. Although the above accidents are major, minor accidents occurs 
frequently costing billions of dollars every year. This resulted in the development 
of many safety regulatory standards such as the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration's (OSHA) Process Safety Management (PSM) standard, and 
Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Risk Management Program(RMP). 
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As a result of the safety regulatory standards, part of the risk analysis 
involves the automation of process hazard analysis. Automation of process 
hazard analysis requires the simulation of a hypothetical risk in a process facility 
(McCoy, 1999). It is an important step to reduce accidents and acts as an aid or 
guideline for preventive measures in process facilities. A successful automated 
system should be able to identify all kinds of possible causes and consequences 
of hazards, failures, and disturbances in a process facility and also be able to 
recommend possible solutions to prevent hazards. There are several models for 
automating risk analysis. The major ones are discussed below. 
1.2 MODELS FOR AUTOMATION OF RISK 
Process hazard analysis models include Checklist Analysis, "What-if" 
Analysis, Fault Tree Analysis, Event Tree Analysis, and HAZOP (hazard and 
operability) analysis. A brief description of each model is given below followed by 
a detailed description of HAZOP analysis. 
1.2.1 CHECK-LIST ANALYSIS MODEL 
A checklist (AICHE, 2000) is a systematic approach built on historical 
knowledge recorded in checklist questions. The questions are related to process 
material properties, process design, and operation procedures. It is applicable to 
any activity or system including equipment issues and human factor issues. 
Checklist analysis is generally performed by an individual trained to understand 
the checklist questions. It is applicable to a process facility throughout its lifetime 
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and can be used as a guideline for maintaining regulatory safety compliance. The 
answer to check-list questions determines the acceptability of a particular item in 
a process facility. The quality of evaluation is determined primarily by the 
experience of the people creating the checklist and is useful to the plant only if 
continuously updated. 
1.2.2 WHAT -IF ANALYSIS MODEL 
What-if analysis (AICHE, 2000) is a brainstorming approach that puts forth 
questions related to an anomaly in process facility behavior that may result in 
accidents or system performance problems. This analysis also ensures 
appropriate safeguards against those problems. These questions are typically 
formulated by one or more teams with diverse backgrounds and experience that 
participate in group review meetings of documentation and field inspection. 
What-if analysis is applicable to any part of the process facility and can be used 
as a high level or detailed risk assessment technique. Just as checklists, What-if 
analysis requires experienced analysts and frequent updates. However, there is 
always a chance to miss a potential problem which would result in an incomplete 
analysis. 
1.2.3 EVENT TREE ANALYSIS MODEL 
An event tree analysis (AICHE, 2000) is an inductive reasoning process 
that starts with an initiating event (node) followed by the binary success or failure 
of subsequent safeguards, human responses, and other safety measures to 
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determine possible outcomes. It is especially suitable to find possible outcomes 
of particular initial events and their respective probabilities using the data for 
initial events and subsequent protections and procedures. Event tree analysis is 
generally applicable for almost any kind of risk assessment application but most 
effective where multiple safeguards are in place as protective measures. An 
event tree considers every node as an independent event and considers the 
outcome of the subsequent nodes to be conditional only on the preceding 
outcome. The downside of this approach is that every new node in the tree 
doubles the number of outcomes in the formation of the tree which in turn 
increases the complexity of analysis. 
1.2.4 FAULT TREE ANALYSIS MODEL 
Fault tree analysis (AICHE, 2000) is a technique that visually models how 
logical relationships among equipment failures, human errors and external 
events can combine to cause specific accidents. It is used most often as a 
system level risk assessment technique. It is also used to address fundamental 
causes of specific accidents dominated by a relatively complex combination of 
events. The tree itself is formed using symbols representing events and logic 
gates. Usually the formation of the tree depends on the selection of the TOP 
event which is the accident being analyzed. Fault tree analysis focuses on a 
single specific accident of interest and requires significant expertise to derive a 
valid conclusion. The main weakness is that much effort is spent in developing 
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the tree and any omission of potential failure path may result in incomplete risk 
analysis. 
1.2.5 HAZOP ANALYSIS MODEL 
1.2.5.1 DEFINITION 
HAZOP is defined as the application of a formal, systematic, critical, 
rigorous examination to the process facility and engineering intentions of new 
and existing facilities to access the hazard potential of mal-operation or mal-
function of individual items or equipment and the consequential effects of the 
facility as a whole. The objective of HAZOP is to stimulate the imagination of a 
review team, including designers and operators, in a systematic way so that they 
can identify potential hazards in a facility. HAZOP is usually applied when 
detailed process Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&ID) are ready but not 
yet frozen (design stage of a process facility). The application of HAZOP in a 
project means that if the problems are identified, they can be corrected before 
the actual detailed design of the process facility. This results in substantial 
saving. The strength of HAZOP is that it examines the process facility as a whole 
thus making it possible to study the effect of a deviation at one point of P&ID in 
another. 
1.2.5.2 HISTORY 
HAZOP originated from personnel management in the early 1970 at 
Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) based in the UK. Here the concepts of 
information flow and communication among the workers is extended to hazard 
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identification. There has been subsequent refinement in the HAZOP procedure, 
but it has remained similar to its original form and content. This technique was 
gradually developed into a formal methodology named HAZOP and become the 
first major risk assessment tool after check-list (Khan & Abbasi, 1998; Kletz, 
1985; Knowloton, 1997; Lawley, 197 4; Mckelvey, 1998; Sweeny, 1993). 
Eventually HAZOP would become the single most widely used risk assessment 
tool (Khan & Abbasi, 1998; Kletz, 1985; Knowloton, 1997; Lawley, 197 4; 
Mckelvey, 1998; Sweeny, 1993). 
1.2.5.3 PROCEDURE 
In a typical HAZOP, a detailed study of the entire process line from start to 
finish is done with the help of piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs) 
covering each and every vessel, conduit, valve, and other control equipment 
employed in the process line. These P&IDs are studied in relation to the 
operation of the process, the causes that may lead to variations in the plant 
operation due to human, process, or material failures, and the likely 
consequences of such failures. HAZOP thus takes into consideration the 
conditions such as temperature, pressure, leak, creep, fatigue, etc. under which 
the physical parts (piping and instruments) are used, the aspects of human 
interaction with the piping and instruments, and the possible aberrations that may 
occur due to human errors, loss of process control, or material failures. 
The group of experts conducting HAZOP is helped along by guide words, 
which enable them to cover all possible malfunctions in the plant in a systematic 
way. The guide words often used are NONE, MORE OF, LESS OF, PART OF 
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and MORE THAN. When these guide words are applied to the process variables 
(temperature, pressure etc.) in any unit of a plant ("study nodes"), one gets the 
corresponding process variable deviations (MORE PRESSURE, MORE 
TEMPERATURE etc.) to be considered for HAZOP analysis. 
To conduct HAZOP successfully by the existing methods, it is essential to 
put together a fairly large team of experts (six or more) (Khan & Abbasi, 1997) 
who have to systematically and critically examine the piping and instrumentation 
diagrams (P&IDs) in relation to the process conditions and human factors. The 
team has to determine the various permutations and combinations of possible 
deviations that can occur during the operation of the plant and the adverse 
consequence of all such deviations. The end objective is to identify the potential 
problems or the soft spots. A flow diagram of a typical HAZOP analysis is shown 
in Figure 1.1 (Ozog, 1985; Pully, 1983; Quershi, 1988; Shafaghi and Cook, 1988; 
Sweeny, 1993). 
1.3 BENEFITS OF AUTOMATED RISK ANALYSIS 
In many process facilities, a HAZOP study is conducted manually. Due to 
lack of sophisticated tools and expertise, the results of such studies remain in 
paperwork. The data collected in the study is often lost over a period of time. 
Furthermore, the team members performing the study become unnecessarily 
occupied with the system complexities and may lose their focus of study. 
Automated HAZOP analysis overcomes these limitations and has several 
advantages over manual HAZOP analysis. The advantages are listed below: 
7 
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• Significant saving of human effort and manpower cost by reviewing most 
commonly occurring fault conditions. 
• The HAZOP study process becomes standardized by automatically 
recalling process parameters and reviewing the results. 
r--1 Select a study node and exnlain its function 
f+ Apply guide word I parameter Develop meaningful deviation 
Yes Find the possible causes and 
consequences. 
Suggest possible solutions. 
Detect hazard and record findings. 
Are there any guide words 
- left to be analyzed? 
N 0 
----1 
Is the analysis of the 
section comnlete? 
Mark the section as 
complete 
Figure 1.1: Typical HAZOP analysis used in a process facility 
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• The results of the automated study can be an aid for manual HAZOP 
analysis thus saving the overall time to conduct the study. 
• It can be an aid for an operator in a chemical plant as a decision support. 
• The study is easier to track thus making it more focused. 
• The results of the study can be stored for later use or printed in a reported 
format. 
1.4 FAULT PROPAGATION AND KNOWLEDGE BASE IN HAZOP 
Two aspects of automated HAZOP analysis are fault propagation and 
knowledge-base. A fault in a process facility is a weakness or an error within the 
system that may arise as a result of an equipment failure, human error or a 
reaction in chemicals used within the system. Fault produces results that are a 
deviation from the original intention of the design of the process plant. Certain 
faults may not be hazardous for certain equipment but become fatal when it 
propagates to other equipment. The recent BP refinery accident (Purvis & 
Herman, 2005) can be taken as an example of how a small failure in one 
equipment can cause a huge accident that affects the entire process facility. The 
BP refinery in Texas consists of operations involving an isomerization unit. The 
Isomerization unit converts raffinate, a low octane blending feed, into higher 
octane components for unleaded regular gasoline. The accident involved the 
Raffinate Splitter tower and the blowout drum, which is part of the conversion 
procedure. The event started unrolling when the level detector failed to find the 
right level of liquid hydrocarbon entering the Raffinate Splitter tower. The 
automatic valve, which was supposed to route the excess liquid out of the tower, 
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also failed. The liquid built up in the tower and exerted great pressure through the 
pipes on the emergency relief valve 150ft below. As a result, three emergency 
valves opened and liquid began flooding the blow down drum at the other end of 
the isomerization unit. Some liquid overflowed from the blow down drum into a 
process sewer but the high level alarm on the blow down drum did not go off. 
The drum filled completely and a geyser-like eruption occurred from the top of 
the blow down drum. The eruption lasted about one minute and liquid fell to the 
ground creating a large flammable vapor cloud resulting in a huge explosion. 
The basic concept of fault propagation used in HAZOP analysis differs 
from the one used in fault tree analysis. In a fault tree (Lapp and Powers, 1977), 
the analysis centers on the identification of the failure of the Top event. A fault in 
a fault tree can propagate from any Basic event to the top event which identifies 
the ultimate failure of the system. The fault propagation between the Basic and 
Top event is represented using logic gates. However, the propagation of fault is 
limited within the top event only (i.e., a single piece of equipment). On the 
contrary, the automated tool described in this paper identifies the propagation of 
fault (deviation) to any number of pieces of equipment. For example, if equipment 
is affected by the deviation "MORE PRESSURE", then the HAZOP analysis 
performed would be able to determine other equipment that is affected and could 
be a cause of hazard due to "MORE PRESSURE" from the original faulty 
equipment. It may be possible that some equipment may not be affected as a 
result of the deviation propagation. But the expert tool would be able to identify 
the influence of the propagation of deviation to neighboring equipment. Figure 
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1.2a and 1.2b represent the conceptual difference of fault propagation used in 
fault tree analysis and an automated HAZOP analysis tool. The example 
illustrates the fact that the fault propagation using fault tree analysis in Figure 
1.2a can only identify the fault within the lamp and cannot identify what other 
hazard can occur as a result of lamp failure. Figure 1.2b shows the propagation 
of deviation and its effect on equipment in a typical process facility as a whole. 
Failure of 
Bulb or Light 
Light Bulb 
Burned Out 
No Light 
Bulb in Lamp 
Propagation of fault from 
basic event to top event 
Failure of Lamp 
or Light 
Failure to Tum 
on Switch 
Wiring 
Shorted 
BASIC EVENT .._ __ _ 
TOP EVENT 
Failure of Electricity 
to Get to Lamp 
No Electricity 
in Wall Outlet 
Fuse 
Blown 
Lamp Not 
Plugged In 
No Power 
To House 
Figure 1.2a: Fault tree for failure of lamp to light 
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Original deviation in 
Adsorber: 
More Pressure 
Adsorber 
.. 
l 
Outputs deviation, causes, 
consequences and solution due 
to the deviation "More 
Pressure" in Adsorber 
Propagation of More 
Pressure from Adsorber 
to Centrifugal Pump 
Centrifugal 
Pump 
l 
Outputs deviation, causes, 
consequences and solution in 
centrifugal pump due to the 
original deviation "More 
Pressure" in Adsorber 
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Propagation of More Pressure 
from Adsorber to Blower 
through Centrifugal Pump 
Blower 
J 
Outputs deviation, causes, 
consequences and solution in 
blower due to the original 
deviation "More Pressure" in 
Adsorber 
Figure 1.2b: Fault propagation using HAZOP analysis in a typical process facility 
A knowledge base is a collection of information set up in a pre-defined format 
which can be retrieved and used for HAZOP study. This information is gathered 
from past HAZOP analysis performed on equipment. This knowledge is stored in 
a database which can be extracted when required. Data can be added by the 
user to derive meaningful results from automated HAZOP analysis. The addition 
of data can be specific to the process facility structure. 
1.5 OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH 
The objectives of this research are as follows: 
• Develop an algorithm that would enable propagation of fault among 
equipment combining the forward and backward search techniques and 
identify propagation of deviation to all downstream equipment. 
12 
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• Conduct automated HAZOP analysis in a process facility with the aid of a 
knowledge base. 
• Develop user friendly automated HAZOP analysis software which would 
integrate the knowledge base and fault propagation algorithm to identify 
hazard in a process facility. 
• Conduct a real life case study to demonstrate application and effectiveness 
of the developed system. 
1.6 ROADMAP 
The chapters of the thesis are divided as follows. Chapter 2 describes the past 
automated HAZOP analysis tools. The features of each tools is described 
followed by their limitations. It then proposes a new expert tool ExpHAZOP+ 
which attempts to overcome some of the previous limitations described in the 
chapter. Chapter 3 describes the three aspects of the developed tool 
ExpHAZOP+ which are the graphical user interface, the knowledge base, and the 
inference engine. Each of these aspects of ExpHAZOP+ is described in detail. 
Chapter 4 describes the fault propagation algorithm and also how the algorithm 
uses the equipment database to automate the system. This chapter also 
describes the modules used to develop the expert system. Chapter 5 describes a 
case study in which the result of the ExpHAZOP+ analysis performed using the 
expert system is shown. Furthermore, it shows that the result of the expert 
system matches the result of ExpHAZOP+ analysis performed using an existing 
13 
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methodology. Chapter 6 draws conclusions and suggests some future 
improvement. Related references are provided at the end. 
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CHAPTER 2 
PAST EXPERT TOOLS FOR HAZOP AUTOMATION 
2.1 REQUIREMENTS OF AN EXPERT TOOL 
HAZOP analysis should be thorough and exhaustive. The HAZOP team 
cannot afford to overlook even the "routine" causes and consequences which 
occur in the process units which are common to many process facilities. Some of 
the commonly found units are pipes, valves, pumps, controllers, sensors, 
instruments etc. The functionality of these units does not vary much from one 
process facility to another. Thus the result of the analysis performed on these 
units in one process would change very little if applied in another process. In that 
sense the analysis of such units are "routine". On the other hand there are 
complex units such as reactors and their support systems, settling tanks, vessels 
and their protective devices, heat exchangers, distillation columns, etc. These 
types of units are often unique in their functionality based on the type of process 
facility. Analyses of such units are difficult to automate and do not fall under any 
repeatable generic approach. 
In manual HAZOP analysis a considerable amount of expert manpower 
time and effort has to be spent in dealing with the analysis of such "routine" 
process units. Thus an automated HAZOP analysis system will reduce the 
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workload of the experts considerably, enabling them to concentrate on the 
HAZOP analysis of the more complex process units. 
The guide word in HAZOP analysis is a systematic and logical procedure 
that makes automation possible using the knowledge-based systems approach. 
It is important to recognize that HAZOP analysis requires a combination of many 
different types of expertise, some of which are specific to the process plant under 
consideration. One of the important challenges in automating HAZOP analysis is 
handling the huge amount of process specific information which is required as 
the input for performing the analysis. The abnormal causes for the process 
variable deviations considered during HAZOP analysis are not only process 
generic equipment failures and operator errors, but also the properties of the 
process materials present. Similarly, the adverse consequences of the process 
variable deviation also depend upon the properties of the process materials 
present in the process facility. In addition, the P&ID of the plant is used for the 
propagation of the process variable deviations. 
It is desirable to develop an automated HAZOP analysis system that is 
context-independent so that it can be used for performing the analysis on a wide 
variety of processes. Automated HAZOP analysis should also be able to find the 
process-specific hazards for the various processes. This requires the user using 
the system to input the process specific knowledge. The process specific 
analysis is then performed using this updated knowledge. In the following 
sections, the various approaches taken in the past to automate the HAZOP 
analysis using intelligent systems are reviewed. 
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2.2 Identification of hazard by fault propagation 
Parmer and Lees (1987a & 1987b) were the first to automate HAZOP 
analysis using a rule-based approach. They applied their automated tool for the 
hazard identification of a water separator system. The knowledge required for 
propagating faults (initiation and termination) in each process unit is represented 
by qualitative propagation equations and event statements. The initiation event 
statements described the initiation of a fault in a malfunctioned unit, the 
propagation equations described the propagation of faults through a normal 
operating unit and the termination event statements described the termination of 
a fault in a unit causing the unit to malfunction. 
The initial event statements are of the form, "initial fault ~ process 
variable deviations", the qualitative propagation equations are of the form, 
"process variable deviation~ process variable deviation", and the terminal event 
statements are of the form, "process variable deviation ~ terminal fault". The 
initiation and the termination statements are the causes and consequences 
respectively, determination of which is the goal of the HAZOP analysis 
procedure. The process materials properties and their susceptibility to cause a 
fault or hazard are also represented in the system. Using this information the 
specific realizations of hazards due to generic faults like "leak" are found. 
The decomposition of the P&ID into process units is done at a coarser 
level. The P&ID of the plant was divided into lines consisting of pipes and other 
units (such as pumps, control loops valves, etc., through which a process stream 
passes) such as vessels. The control loop which consists of the sensor, 
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controller and control valve, and its bypass was represented as a single process 
unit. The starting point of HAZOP analysis is a process variable deviation in a 
line. A line consists of pipe-work and other units through which a process stream 
passes between vessels. The causes generated by searching for the initial 
events and the consequences by searching the terminal events. But the causes 
and consequences generated for a process variable deviation are confined to the 
line under consideration and the vessel connected to it. Thus this method finds 
only the immediate causes and the immediate consequences, unlike the actual 
HAZOP analysis in which the causes and consequences are propagated to the 
end of the process section under consideration to find all the adverse 
consequences due to every abnormal cause. This automated hazard 
identification system was implemented using FORTRAN 77 and PROLOG. The 
computer method generated a more exhaustive list of results compared to the 
conventional analysis performed by the HAZOP team. Thus there is need for the 
development of pruning rules and further enhancement using the expert systems 
approach. 
2.3 The Expert System HAZOPEX 
A rule-based expert system prototype called HAZOPEX was developed 
using the KEE shell by Karvonen and co-workers (1990). The HAZOPEX 
system's knowledge base consisted of the structure of the process system and 
rules for searching causes and consequences. The rules to search potential 
causes are of the type, "IF deviation type AND process structure or conditions 
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THEN potential cause". One important drawback of these rules is that the 
condition part of the rules depends on the process structure. For example, for a 
process variable deviation in a line, the rules for finding the causes has to check 
what unit is connected upstream and will then find the appropriate causes. This 
increases the number of rules required as the number of process units increases, 
thereby limiting the generality of the system. Also in HAZOPEX, the identification 
of abnormal causes was more emphasized and less was said about the adverse 
consequences, though in actual HAZOP analysis the identification of adverse 
consequences is given priority. HAZOPEX's knowledge-base consisted of 330 
rules for searching causes of deviations and 20 rules for finding consequences. 
In addition, the knowledge-base of HAZOPEX did not have the process material 
property information for finding process-specific consequences. HAZOPEX's 
performance was evaluated on a small part of an ammonia system case study for 
which HAZOPEX was found to include useful knowledge about the potential 
causes of deviations which can be used as a checklist for the user. 
2.4 Identification of hazards using qualitative simulation 
Waters and Ponton (1989) developed a quasi-state qualitative simulation 
approach based on the earlier work of De Kleer and Brown (1984). They found 
the approach to be highly combinatorial thus restricting its practical usefulness. 
Their qualitative simulation approach will explore all behaviors that are consistent 
with the initial state of the system and the input deviations. But many of these 
explored behaviors will not be useful from a safety perspective. Their qualitative 
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simulation program was written in PROLOG and implemented on a Sun 3/50 
workstation. They reported that the time taken to perform qualitative simulation 
substantially exceeded that required for a numerical simulation involving 
considerable detail for the simple systems tested. 
2.5 Inductive and Deductive Reasoning Approach 
Nagel (1991) developed an inductive and deductive reasoning based 
approach to automatically identify potential hazards in chemical process facility. 
The approach identified hazards that may occur due to hazardous reactions in 
the process facility and the requisite conditions that enable the occurrence of 
these reactions. It further inquires design or operational faults which could cause 
these hazards. This is a reaction-based hazard identification approach. The 
catalytic production of aniline from nitrobenzene and hydrogen is given as an 
example, for which the system automatically identifies possible top level hazards. 
Language for Chemical Reactivity (LCR) is used to describe chemicals, 
properties and reactions. The paths connecting the root causes to the top level 
hazards, for the given P&ID and operating conditions are found using a deductive 
reasoning approach. The modeling language, MODEL.LA (MODELing 
LAnguage) developed by Stephanopoulos et al. (1990) is used to describe 
processing systems, unit operations, operating conditions and behavior. 
Topological fault trees are constructed based on the results obtained by the 
above reasoning procedure. The application of this approach was limited to 
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hazards where chemical reactions are involved. Thus this approach is not as 
general or as useful as conventional PHA approaches. 
2.6 Qualitative Hazard Identified System 
A prototype hazard identification system, called Qualitative Hazard 
Identifier (QHI), was developed by Catino and Ungar (1995). QHI works by 
exhaustively positing possible faults from a library, automatically building 
qualitative process models, simulating them and checking hazards. One main 
difference between the QHI algorithm and the HAZOP analysis procedure is that 
QHI's analysis starts with the faults whereas the HAZOP analysis starts with 
process deviations. Although this is an efficient approach requiring only forward 
simulation to determine immediate deviation and hazards, as compared with the 
HAZOP analysis which requires both a simulation to determine the hazards and 
a fault diagnosis to determine the faults, the QHI approach requires the library of 
faults to be complete. 
In QHI the model of a given physical system is built by choosing the 
physics and chemistry from a predefined library of fundamental physical and 
chemical phenomena such as heat and mass transfer, chemical reaction and 
phase equilibrium. This modeling approach was implemented using the 
Qualitative Process Compiler (QPC) developed by Crawford and associates 
(1990). The qualitative simulation of these models thus generated is performed 
using the QSIM algorithm of Kuipers (1986) and possible behaviors are 
determined. Perfect controller and pseudo steady-state assumptions were used 
in order to simplify the complexity of the qualitative simulation. The plant P&ID, 
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the substances present and assumptions about operating conditions are the 
information that has to be input into the QHI system for performing the PHA. 
The QHI algorithm was applied for the hazard identification of the reactor 
section of a nitric acid plant. For this case study, QHI evaluated the effects of the 
faults leaks, broken partially and completely blocked filters and pipes, controller 
failures leading to valve failures, etc. The number of behaviors generated by 
qualitative simulation of a fault ranges between 1 0 and 1600, with 40 and 1 00 
behaviors for most of the faults. For some of these faults the simulation and 
hazard identification were completed in a matter of seconds whereas for many 
others, QHI took hours to days to complete. Also, for some faults, the memory on 
a Sun SparcStation was exhausted and the QHI could not identify the hazards. 
This is an important drawback for this approach as it is too fine-grained for 
industrial-scale applications and thus restricts the generality of its use. 
2.7 Operability Study Expert System 
A prototype expert system for operability study which uses "fault 
propagation decision tables" of process units was described by Shimada, and 
associates (1994). The plant structure (P&ID) and reaction types were input to 
the plant specific knowledge base of the expert system. The "process words" 
(process variables) and "guide words" (deviations) and the decision tables of the 
units formed the generic knowledge base. The process unit decision tables are 
qualitative, casual input-output variable relation, fault propagation models, which 
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were similar to those used by Parmer and Lees (1987a and b). The system was 
implemented in PROLOG and sample results were presented for the HAZOP 
analysis of the Solvay Process for manufacturing sodium bicarbonate. There was 
no mention of the process material property knowledge, which is an important 
part of HAZOP analysis needed to identify process hazards. Thus this expert 
system only identifies operability problems due to faults and not the hazards in 
the plant due to process material properties and process deviations. Also, the 
HAZOP results produced by the expert system are in the form of "qualitative 
cause/consequence equation record sheets", which were not user friendly. There 
was no discussion on how these record sheets output by the system could be 
converted to the normal text form to be used by conventional HAZOP team. 
2.8 Knowledge-based Prototype 
Suh, Lee and Yon (1997) developed a knowledge-based expert system for 
automated HAZOP analysis. This system comprises of three knowledge bases: 
unit knowledge base, organizational knowledge base and material knowledge 
base, and three hazard analysis algorithms: deviation malfunction and accident 
analysis algorithm. This system was developed using object-oriented language-
C++ based on PC. However, only models of pipe, valve, heat exchanger, tank 
mixer, control valve and pump had been developed. Models for other process 
units were under programming. 
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2.9 HAZOP analysis for a complex process 
An expert system was developed by Venkatasubramanian and 
Vaidyanathan (1995, 1996) in object-oriented architecture with G2 expert shell 
system. Both this approach and the one described next uses the idea of the 
separation of the knowledge required to perform HAZOP analysis into process 
specific and process general knowledge. This expert system further uses 
Diagraph-based (directed graph) HAZOP models of the process units to derive 
an input-output relationship among equipment. The process specific knowledge 
consists of process material properties and process P&ID. The process general 
knowledge consists of HAZOP digraph models of the process units which are 
signed directed graph based on qualitative casual models developed specifically 
for HAZOP identification. This is by far the most extensive automated HAZOP 
analysis tool developed so far and applied successfully on real-life process 
facilities. However the system requires large memory which restricts running of 
the system only on mainframe or large machines. It handles up to 12 process 
units. The knowledge-base creation is complex and is difficult for modification by 
an ordinary user. 
2.10 The Knowledge-base Expert System TOPHAZOP 
Khan and Abbasi (1997) proposed a knowledge base software tool, called 
TOPHAZOP, for conducting automated HAZOP analysis. The knowledge base 
consists of two main branches: process-specific and process-general. The 
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process-specific knowledge base has been classified into two main groups: 
objects (process units) and its attributes (process parameters), causes and 
consequences. The objects are developed in frame structure with attributes while 
causes and consequence are developed in rule networks attached to the frame. 
The general knowledge is classified in generic causes and generic 
consequences. The system is developed under an object oriented environment 
using C++ language and can run on commonly used desktops. However 
TOPHAZOP does not indicate the interactions between parameters and 
deviation propagation to the downstream process units, which might lead to 
incomplete HAZOP analysis. 
2.11 Limitations of Past Attempts 
Even as each of these attempts has added to the precision and sophistication in 
automating HAZOP, a great deal remains to be done. For example, the following 
limitations besiege each of the past attempts: 
• The majority of the developed expert tools were dependent on the process 
facility structure. There was no general way to apply the expert tool 
developed for one particular process facility to another. 
• There was more emphasis on the identification of causes of deviations 
rather than the effect (consequences) of these deviations. 
• The acquisition of knowledge was limited to only four types of equipment 
(storage vessel, pipe lines, operational unit, and control systems). The 
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systems neglect typical process operations such as mass transfer, heat 
transfer, reaction, etc. 
• There is no direct avenue to study fault propagation (deviation propagation) 
from one unit to another. 
• Large volumes of data regarding process and equipment must be keyed-in 
for analyzing a single deviation. 
2.12 Proposed Expert Tool ExpHAZOP+ 
This proposed work attempts to overcome some of these limitations specially 
applying the expert tool to all process facility regardless of the process structure 
and fault propagation. Part of the proposed work is the development of a unique 
algorithm for fault propagation. The algorithm is unique as it can identify fault 
propagation to all downstream units which was not achieved in the previous 
systems. It would also add an efficient knowledge base with an emphasis on the 
consequences of deviation. The proposed system would be suitable for an 
ordinary user, as opposed to an expert, to dynamically update process specific 
knowledge to the knowledge base. This would enable the user to perform a 
modified HAZOP analysis. The expert system is named ExpHAZOP+. The 
proposed expert tool would overcome the limitation of the past tools by allowing 
propagation of deviation to all downstream units. ExpHAZOP+ consists of three 
components: the Graphical User interface, Knowledge base, and Inference 
Engine. Details of these components will be elaborated in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3 
ExpHAZOP+ METHODOLOGY 
3.1 optHAZOP METHODOLOGY 
ExpHAZOP+ has its roots from the optHAZOP (optimum HAZOP) 
procedure originally developed by Khan and Abbasi (1997). The optHAZOP is a 
HAZOP study procedure that uses a developed expert knowledge base 
(information base). This information base is a collection of facts, rules and 
information regarding various components of a process facility. The information 
can be used for basic recommendations to give effective and reliable results. 
The algorithm for the optHAZOP procedure is presented in Figure 3.1. The 
main element of the optHAZOP procedure is a knowledge based software tool 
which is needed to identify all probable deviations in the functioning of a process 
facility. This knowledge base software cuts the total study time by more than 45% 
compared to the conventional manual HAZOP procedure. The knowledge base 
reduces the expert manpower required by manual HAZOP analysis. This enables 
the HAZOP study to be performed more economically. 
ExpHAZOP+ enhances optHAZOP by uniquely identifying the propagation 
of deviation in any number of pieces of equipment in any section of the process 
facility. It also applies the concept of an information base described in 
optHAZOP. 
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Figure 3.1: The optHAZOP methodology 
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3.2 ARCHITECTURE OF ExpHAZOP+ 
The architecture of ExpHAZOP+ consists of the following three 
components, a graphical user interface, a knowledge base and an inference 
engine. The object oriented architecture of ExpHAZOP+ is presented in Figure-
3.2. The figure shows the interconnection between the three components. 
Graphical user Interface 
User 
r-
graphical editor to 
drawP&ID 
.I Input I Output I I 
!L 
[ Report Generation ) (user input for process 
specific knowledge) 
: • Inference Engine Knowledge Base 
Method for finding abnormal causes and consequences ~ 
Process Specific Process General 
Method for propagation of deviation Knowledge Knowledge 
Figure 3.2 The architecture of ExpHAZOP+ 
3.2.1 GRAPHICAL USER INTERFACE (GUI) 
The graphical user interface consists of an open interface in which the 
user has the option to perform a HAZOP analysis by drawing a P&ID diagram 
using existing equipment or perform the analysis using his own defined 
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equipment. Each piece of equipment is connected to its own database. The 
database consists of process general knowledge for the equipment. When a user 
interacts with equipment for HAZOP analysis, a list of related process variable 
deviations is displayed. When a user selects a piece equipment or a group of 
equipment with corresponding process variable deviation, the causes and 
consequences related to the process variable deviation is displayed on a 
separate screen. 
To perform a user-defined HAZOP analysis, the user needs to define his 
equipment. This is done by providing the name of the equipment, an equipment 
picture, the deviations related to the equipment as a result of abnormal causes 
and adverse consequences. The graphical user interface will prompt the user 
again and again until he finishes entering his data. This data is directly updated 
in the database in a table format with the other existing equipment table. Upon 
completion of user data and drawing P&ID, the user selects the section of the 
P&ID in which HAZOP analysis is required. This section is called the study node. 
The study node is denoted by drawing a rectangular region in the graphical user 
interface. The output for the analysis is the deviation with causes and 
consequences. The user has the option to store the analysis for later user or 
output it for Report Generation. The Report Generation outputs the result of the 
user defined HAZOP analysis in MSWord format. 
The graphical user interface also allows the user to perform some general 
functions such as saving and opening a particular P&ID, adding captions to 
equipment and lines for identification, etc. Figure 3.3a shows an example of a 
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typical graphical user interface with process general equipment. It also shows the 
menus related to the equipment. Figure 3.3b shows the entering of data by 
P:.<t.!lli.'>Yt! E(lUipff!ijfll; 
Comt~d l:.qtJipmt:nt 
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0 
Figure 3.3 a The Graphical User Interface with menus (GUI) 
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Figure 3.3 b The GUI with process specific equipment 
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the user from the GUI for process specific equipment. Figure 3.4 shows the 
connection between the graphical user interface and the knowledge base. It 
shows the procedure in which the inference engine performs a search in the 
knowledge base and outputs the result of the search to the graphical user 
interface. 
I l 
1--A-d-so-r-be-r----1 ~ ~fu~:~::~;:::::~si~~- ! ~ ~ 
centrifuge -···r··• centrifuge Table 1------.~ ~ ~ 
1-------1 Cyclone Table 
0 
Cyclone N 
Fault Propagation 
GUI 
Figure 3.4: Connection between the GUI and knowledge-base 
3.2.2 KNOWLEDGE BASE 
The knowledge base (Khan and Abbasi 1997, 2000) consists of information 
derived from past HAZOP analyses related to process operation, process 
equipment, operating problems, failure mode and failure frequencies. The 
information is developed using practical industrial case studies of various 
process facilities. If the information is properly presented and maintained, it can 
be used for a long period of time and also for other safety related study 
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purposes. Based on the collected information, a computerized knowledge base 
is built using MS Access as the back-end and Visual Basic as the front-end. 
One of the observations in developing the knowledge base from studying 
past accidents in process facilities is that the causes for equipment failure do not 
vary much from one process facility to another even though the consequences 
may vary based on the structure and operation performed in the process facility. 
The consequences are functions of process types, process conditions, and 
chemicals in use. The inclusion of recommendations in an expert system to 
overcome or reduce the consequences will not be effective as the 
recommendation will be based on the type of failure, the consequences and 
economic feasibility. However a general set of recommendations for various 
failure scenarios of a particular component can be developed in the knowledge 
base. These recommendations will serve as a base to find out more 
economically feasible and reliable recommendations. 
The acquisition of knowledge used in ExpHAZOP+ encompasses process 
equipment as well as process operations. The knowledge base is characterized 
in seven different operations commonly present in a process facility. Each 
operation and the equipment required to perform the operation in the 
ExpHAZOP+ knowledge base are categorized as follows: 
• Mass transfer operation: units involving the transfer of one or more 
component from one stream to another stream (e.g. extractor, adsorbers, 
dust collectors, electrostatic, precipitators, filters). 
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• Heat transfer operation: units involving the transfer of heat from one 
stream to other stream (e.g. air cooled exchangers, carbon block 
exchangers, shell and tube exchanger, plate and frame exchangers etc.). 
• Mass and heat transfer combined, units involving both chemical and heat 
transfer (e.g. distillation columns). 
• Reaction: units involving chemical transformations including oxidation (e.g. 
continuous stirred-tank reactors, plug flow reactors, autoclaves). 
• Transporlation: units involving transfer or movement of chemicals from 
one place to another (e.g. piping, compressors, pumps, valves). 
• Storage: storing bulk quantities of chemicals (e.g. vessels). 
• Other physical operations, such as mixing, compression, relief venting, 
purging, relief device etc. 
An operation may encompass one or more pieces of equipment. For example 
transportation units consist of piping, compressors, pumps and valves. The 
knowledge base incorporates 19 different pieces of equipment related to the 
process facility. The equipment are: adsorber, air cooled exchanger, blower, 
carbon block exchanger, centrifuge, compressor, cyclone, distillation column, 
dust collector, electrostatic precipitator, extractor, filter heat exchanger, piping, 
pump, reactor, temperature sensor, temperature controller and valve. 
The architecture of the knowledge base is shown in Figure 3.5 (Khan and 
Abbasi 1997, 2000). This figure describes the hierarchy or the organization of the 
knowledge base. In this figure, each piece of equipment consists of a set of 
deviations. Each set of deviation consists of a set of causes. Each cause 
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corresponds to a consequence. An example of the equipment adsorber is 
represented in the MS Access database is shown in Table 3.1. The knowledge 
for all equipment either general or specific is entered in the same format i.e. the 
equipment name, corresponding deviations, causes and consequences. The 
equipment tables are connected by means of the common deviations (generic or 
specific) entered by the user. 
Knowledge base 
General Process Knowledge Specific Process knowledge with attributes 
Equipment 
Deviation in Parameters 
Rule Network for General 
causes and consequences 
Suggested solution for hazard 
prevention 
Equipment 
Available User Deviations 
Rule Network for Specific 
causes and consequences 
Suggested solution for 
hazard prevention 
Figure 3.5: The architecture of the knowledge base 
3.2.2.1 PROCESS GENERAL KNOWLEDGE 
The process general knowledge is the information that has been collected over 
years for a particular equipment independent to the operation it involves. There is 
no attribute attached to the equipment. It consists of equipment deviations with 
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corresponding generic causes and consequences. The process generic 
knowledge is gathered based on the following data: 
Table 3.1: Representation of an adsorber database 
Blockage of packing I trays 
Process liquid reintroduced 
into improperly cooled 
adsorber 
loss of vacuum 
ir leakage into equipment 
operating under vacuum 
Uncontrolled condensation/ 
absorption of vapor phase 
component 
exposure of packing internals 
flammable material to air 
High concentration of 
mables in the inlet stream 
a carbon bed adsorber 
1) Equipment and their capacities. 
2) Physical state of the chemicals. 
porization of the process 
liquid 
hot spots and fire 
mpositions outside of 
metallurgical limits (e.g., 
3) Chemical (or material) characteristics such as flammability, toxicity etc. 
s: 
1 
11 
4) Physical and chemical properties of chemicals such as vapor pressure, heat 
combustion etc. 
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3.2.2.2 PROCESS SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE 
Process specific knowledge is additional knowledge provided by an expert 
using ExpHAZOP+. Upon identifying the plant operations and the corresponding 
equipment the expert adds specific attributes and knowledge as well as 
additional equipment required to perform the operation. Process specific 
knowledge varies from plant to plant and depends on the type of operation 
performed in a process unit. The knowledge base in a process specific unit is 
classified into two main groups (Khan and Abbasi 1997, 2000): 
a) Objects: developed using frame structures with attributes. 
b) Causes and consequences: developed using an if-else rule network. 
An analysis is then performed to invoke the causes and consequences for a 
particular object. The specific knowledge base consists: 
1) Types of operation. 
2) Equipment (operational units). 
3) Operating conditions. 
4) Atmospheric conditions. 
5) Chemicals in use and their properties. 
6) Location of units with respect to their surroundings. 
7) Interaction among different units 
3.2.3 INFERENCE ENGINE 
The inference engine is an intermediary between the knowledge base and 
the graphical user interface. It acts as a search engine which searches for 
deviations selected by the user throughout the study node selected by the user in 
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the GUI. The output of the search can be used to manually deduce information 
by an operator of a chemical plant for decision making. The inference engine 
uses the fault propagation algorithm described in Chapter 4 to propagate a 
deviation and identify the causes and consequences of the deviations. 
Once the user draws the process and instrumentation diagram and selects 
the study node in the graphical user interface, the inference engine is used to 
perform a search within the equipments in the study node. The search is 
performed in the database tables for both process general and process specific 
knowledge. The search is performed based on the deviation selected by the 
user. An example of a deviation can be "LESS TEMPERATURE", "MORE 
PRESSURE" etc. The starting and the ending equipment are chosen by the user 
along which the deviation propagates (details in Chapter 4). Deviation 
propagates all the way downstream or the last equipment specified by the user. 
The deviation for process specific operation similarly propagates from equipment 
to equipment, based on the process specific deviation provided by the user. If 
certain equipment does not contain the user chosen deviation then that 
equipment does not produce an output. However as a result of propagation the 
next equipment which might have that specific deviation in its database will 
generate output. The end result identifies all the possible causes and 
consequences that might result in the failure of the process facility. The fault 
propagation algorithm procedure is described in details in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER4 
FAULT PROPAGATION AND EXPHAZOP+ MODULES 
4.1 DEVELOPMENT OF THE FAULT PROPAGATION ALGORITHM 
A process facility consists of equipment (units) whose failure presents a 
hazard in the process facility and initiates a fault. Some of the general faults are 
blockages, leaks etc. Other faults are specific to the process facility such as a 
low flow rate of monoethylene glycol in a polyethylene terephthalate plant. In 
manual HAZOP analysis a team of experts undergoes brainstorming sessions in 
order to identify these faults based on the structure of the process facility. Once 
the fault is identified, a manual search is then performed in order to find how the 
fault can propagate through the pipeline and cause damage to itself and its 
neighboring units. It is possible that the propagation of the fault may not affect 
other units at all. In that case the unit itself is further analyzed and preventive 
measures are taken. 
The central idea of fault propagation is not based on any particular 
propagation equation or event statement but on the basic assumption that faults 
can propagate through pipelines that are connected to equipment. A fault can be 
in the form of an increase or decrease of the set temperature, pressure, flow etc. 
designed to perform an operation in a process facility. The propagation of 
deviation through pipes is controlled by valves and sensors which have a certain 
limitation or capacity. When this capacity is exceeded due to an anomaly in the 
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process facility behavior, it is possible for the deviation to propagate from one 
piece of equipment to another. However, to perform a HAZOP analysis based on 
this assumption it is necessary to identify all the connecting equipment and 
pipelines in which the analysis is performed. Furthermore, the knowledge 
associated with all the connecting equipment in the P&ID with their causes and 
consequences of such deviations, is also required. The knowledge base and the 
inference engine which performs the search have been described in Chapter 3. 
The fault propagation algorithm described below is the application of the 
inference engine in association with the knowledge base. 
4.2 FAULT PROPAGATION ALGORITHM 
The fault propagation algorithm consists of the following steps: 
1) Identify equipment based on their operation. 
2) Select the study node to perform the HAZOP analysis. 
3) Identify the starting and ending equipment. 
4) Select the deviation for the starting equipment. 
5) Determine if the deviation is related to process generic operation. 
6) Apply propagation method to identify general causes and consequences. 
7) Determine if the deviation is related to process specific operation. 
8) Apply propagation method to identify specific causes and consequences. 
9) Move to the next equipment. 
1 0) End the search if this is the last equipment. Otherwise repeat the 
procedure from step 3 - 8. 
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In previously developed algorithms for fault propagation the HAZOP analysis 
performed a forward search to find the causes of the deviation and then a 
backward search to find the consequences as a result of the causes. The 
developed algorithm combines the forward and backward search techniques by 
finding the connectivity of all pipes and equipment and extracting the causes and 
consequences for each piece of equipment. This allows the propagation of 
deviation of the identified fault to all downstream units. The flow diagram for the 
fault propagation algorithm is shown in Figure 4. 1. 
4.3 STEPS FOR HAZOP ANALYSIS PROCEDURE 
The algorithm is part of the HAZOP analysis procedure developed in 
ExpHAZOP+. The complete HAZOP analysis in ExpHAZOP+ requires the 
following steps: 
1) Development of P&ID diagram: The process and instrumentation diagram 
varies from one process facility to another. To perform the HAZOP the user must 
have all the data for equipment entered in the P&ID for a complete HAZOP 
analysis. If the user changes equipment at a certain point of the analysis, then 
that point is identified by ExpHAZOP+ so that when new equipment is replaced 
the analysis restarts from that point. The HAZOP analysis is performed on 
connected equipment as well as on single pieces of equipment. Once a P&ID is 
complete it is ready for HAZOP analysis. 
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Select the study node to 
perform HAZOP analysis 
Select the starting and ending unit and 
initialize process variable deviation 
Select the deviation to be applied 
Is the 
deviation 
process 
specific? 
YES 
Apply propagation 
method to identify 
specific causes and 
consequences 
NO 
Is the 
deviation 
process 
generic? 
YES 
Apply propagation 
method to identify 
general causes and 
consequences 
YES 
Output deviations 
for all equipments 
Figure 4.1: Fault propagation algorithm for ExpHAZOP+ 
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2) Selection of process general and process specific equipment: The 
process general equipment is already available as menu buttons on the GUI. The 
database for equipment is also present in Access Database. The process 
specific equipment figure is entered by the user. The process specific input 
requirements are the same as process general equipment except that the input 
comes from the user. Once the user provides the required data it is automatically 
updated in the database. 
3) Selection of a study node: The study node is selected by the user in order to 
perform the HAZOP analysis. All the equipment and pipes are entered in a data 
structure in order to identify the connectivity of the equipment and pipes inside 
the study node. Only the equipment inside the study nodes are considered as the 
starting and ending points of the analysis. 
4) Creation of data structure: All the equipment and pipes along with their 
connectivity are stored in a collection data structure. However, only the 
equipment and the connecting pipes inside the study node are stored in a two 
dimensional array of arrays. The size of the array depends on the complexity of 
the connectivity of the P&ID diagram. For each connection between two 
equipment there will be a new row in the array. The number of columns depends 
on the number of downstream equipment with which the equipment is connected. 
The names of the equipment and pipes are also stored inside this array for 
identification purpose. 
5) Performing HAZOP analysis: This step involves selecting the starting and 
ending equipment in which the HAZOP analysis is performed. The process 
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variable deviation applied to all equipment during the deviation propagation is 
also selected in this step. The deviation propagation algorithm described in figure 
4.1 is applied at this step. 
6) Selection of path for HAZOP analysis: There can be more than one 
possible path from the starting equipment to the ending equipment. This path is 
sorted out once the user enters the starting and ending equipment for HAZOP 
analysis. If there is more than one path, then all the paths are shown to the user 
so that the user can choose his choice of path for HAZOP analysis. Upon the 
choice of the user, the path is sorted from the two dimensional array. The GUI 
will then give the user the option to choose a path of his choice for performing the 
HAZOP analysis. The equipment database is accessed for all equipment present 
in the selected path. The user then selects the path and performs the desired 
analysis. 
7) Report Generation: In this step the final result for analysis is output in a 
Report format in Microsoft Word. The result of the analysis can be used by an 
expert to perform manual HAZOP analysis. This would enable the HAZOP 
analysis to be more focused and less time consuming. 
4.4 MODULES IN ExpHAZOP+ 
ExpHAZOP+ consists of six main modules: Equipment Module, Pipe 
Module, Data Module, Connectivity Analysis Module, Fault Propagation Analysis 
Module and General Purpose Module. Each module performs a specific task, 
and is linked with the other modules. For example, the Fault propagation 
identifies propagation of deviation in equipment provided in the form of input 
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output relations by the Data Module. The architecture and the message flow 
sequence in ExpHAZOP+ are presented in Figure 4.2. 
4.4.1 GENERAL PURPOSE MODULE 
This module deals with handling of data files, output files, and general flow 
of information. The general purpose module also works as a "passageway" in 
that it provides the necessary information to each module and sub module to 
carry out desired operations, and stores the results in different files. It also 
provides all commonly used file operations such as copying, deleting, printing 
and report generation of the result of HAZOP analysis. 
4.4.2 EQUIPMENT AND PIPE MODULE 
The equipment and pipe module consists of the general properties of 
equipment and pipes. For the equipment module, the properties include the 
storing of the equipment name, a unique tag, the height and width as well as the 
symbol of the equipment in the P&ID. The pipe module stores similar information 
as well as the tag id for the input and output equipment connected with the pipe. 
These features enable a user to draw a P&ID diagram. The equipment module 
further extends by adding features to store the user defined equipment data. 
4.4.3 DATA MODULE 
In this module all data relevant to equipment and pipes are stored in the 
data structure. A separate data structure is maintained for pipes and equipment. 
The equipment data structure stores the equipment name, unique tag as well as 
the label by which the user identifies the equipment. The pipe data structure 
stores the pipeline number, the input connecting equipment, the output 
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connecting equipment, as well as the user defined label for the input and output 
equipment. 
I User I 
~ 
General Purpose 
Equipment Pipe 
Report Generation 
Equipment Editing Pipe 
Properties File Open I Save Properties 
Equipment Interface 
Pipe Interface 
~ 
Data 
Equipment Data 
Pipe Data 
Study Node Data 
~ 
Connectivity 
Analysis 
Find Connection 
·~ 
Fault Propagation 
General Fault 
Specific Fault 
~ 
I Output I 
Figure 4.2: Architecture ofthe message flow of the modules in ExpHAZOP+ 
At first all the equipment and pipe data for the P&ID entered in the GUI are 
stored in their respective data structures. This is followed by filtering the data of 
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the equipment and pipes lying inside the study node. This filtered data is stored 
separately in a two-dimensional array. This allows for faster access of data. An 
example data structure with a user selected study node is shown in Figure 4.3. 
The study node is shown in the dotted rectangle. 
Idl-
Adl 
Id3-
Bll 
Col 
Id6-
Coml 
Id8 
U-----~ Vall 
Id4 
Co2 
Id7 
Val2 
Figure 4.3. A typical GUI input for a set of equipment with their 
tag and label connected to a set of pipelines 
In Figure 4.3, each block represents a separate piece of equipment 
consisting of a unique tag represented by /d1 .. /d9. The user defined label (e.g. 
the equipment with tag ld1 has the user defined label Ad1) is also shown along 
with the tag. In an actual GUI, only the user defined label is displayed. The tag is 
shown here for analysis purpose only. The pipeline is numbered 1 .. 9 to identify 
the pipes connecting the equipment. The representation of pipeline data which is 
shown in Figure 4.3 is stored according to Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1: Representation of the complete pipeline data entered in the GUI 
ld1 Ad1 1 ld2 Co1 
ld1 Ad1 2 ld3 811 
ld2 Co1 3 ld4 Co2 
ld3 811 4 ld6 Com1 
ld3 811 5 IdS 812 
ld2 Col1 6 IdS 812 
ld4 Co2 7 ld7 Val2 
IdS 812 8 ld8 Val1 
ld7 Val2 9 ld9 Rea1 
ld8 Val1 10 ld9 Rea1 
The above data structure is filtered when the user draws a study node. The 
filtered data is stored in a two dimensional array as shown in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2: Filtered data obtained from study node in Figure 4.3 
ld1 Ad1 1 ld2 Co1 
ld1 Ad1 2 ld3 811 
ld3 811 s IdS 812 
ld2 Col1 6 IdS 812 
The filtered data structure is used in the Connectivity Analysis module . 
4.4.4 CONNECTIVITY ANALYSIS MODULE 
The main purpose of this module is to find all the connecting paths from 
the starting equipment to the ending equipment. The connectivity module uses 
two procedures. The lnputOutput Procedure and the FindConnection procedure. 
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The lnputOutput Procedure derives the tag ld of the starting and ending 
equipment while the FindConnection Procedure identifies all paths from the 
starting equipment to the ending equipment. The pseudo code for the 
FindConnection procedure is given below. 
In FindConnection procedure mArray consist of the equipment and pipes 
data inside the study node including the starting and ending equipment. At first 
anarrayRow consists of only the rows in the mArray which has the starting 
equipment. temparray tracks the paths that are connected from the starting 
equipment inside the study node from mArray. Thus it is assured that temparray 
would only reach until the last equipment selected by the user in the mArray. 
Every time temparray stores a new path from the mArray it is updated in 
anarrayRow. In this example mArray is the data structure shown in Table 4.2. 
Procedure FindConnections() 
Repeat 
While the end of mArray is not reached 
If items in Column1 of mArray matches the starting equipment 
Store that row for mArray in anarrayRow. 
Store the equipment connected with the starting equipment in aString. 
End While 
Repeat for each item in a String 
While the end of mArray is not reached 
If items in Column1 of mArray matches the item in aString 
Store this item in temparray 
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If this is the first occurance of the item in mArray 
Find the Row in anarrayRow in which the item be added. 
Add the item in anarrayRow (Row) 
Else 
Find the Row in anarrayRow in which the item be added. 
Copy the anarrayRow(Row) 
Add the item in the copied anarrayRow(Row). 
End If 
End If 
End While 
/fthere are elements in temparray 
Erase aString 
aString = temparray 
Erase temparray 
End If 
Until there are elements in the temparray. 
End Procedure 
Thus it is assured that all the connected paths from the starting equipment to the 
ending equipment are stored in anarrayRow. This is represented in table 4.3. 
Table 4.3: All possible paths between starting and ending equipment 
ld1 Ad1 1 ld2 Co1 6 ld5 812 
ld1 Ad1 2 ld3 811 5 ld5 812 
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The user performing the HAZOP analysis will have the option to perform the 
analysis on any of the two paths from ld1 to ld5. Once the user selects the path 
the fault propagation algorithm is applied using the Fault Propagation Module. 
4.4.5 FAULT PROPAGATION MODULE 
This module applies the fault propagation algorithm in order to identify the 
causes and consequences of the deviation provided by the user for the starting 
equipment. The module uses the function cmdPerformAnalysis to find the 
propagation of deviation of the path chosen by the user. This function first 
distinguishes between process general and process specific knowledge. For 
process general knowledge it outputs the data directly from the equipment 
database. For process specific knowledge, the causes and consequences come 
from the user input which is stored in a temporary database. The data structure 
which gives the user an option to choose a path for HAZOP analysis in the 
connectivity analysis module is used to access the equipment database. The 
pseudo code for cmdPerformAnalysis is shown below: 
Function cmdPerformAnalysis 
For each equipment in anarrayRow for the user chosen row 
If the equipment is user defined 
Else 
Access the user defined temporary database 
Output Deviation, Connecting input equipment, starting 
deviation, Causes and Consequences. 
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Access the equipment database 
Output Deviation, Connecting input equipment, starting 
deviation, Causes and Consequences. 
End If 
End For 
End Function 
The result of the analysis performed on the first path in Table 4.3 is shown in 
Table 4.4. This table shows how the deviation "More Pressure" propagates from 
the starting equipment adsorber (AD1) to the ending equipment blower (BL2) and 
outputs the causes and consequences for each piece of equipment along the 
way. As absorber is the first equipment in this sequence it does not have any 
connecting equipment. 
Table 4.4: Result of the HAZOP analysis by ExpHAZOP+. 
ITEM CONNECTING ORIGINAL DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES 
EQUIPMENT DEVIATION 
Adsorber Original More pressure Migration of blockages I rupture 
deviation of internals into 
More Pressure lines 
fromADl 
Adsorber Original More pressure Blockage of rupture 
deviation of packing I trays 
More Pressure 
fromADl 
Adsorber Original More pressure Process liquid vaporization of the 
deviation of reintroduced process liquid 
More Pressure into 
from ADl improperly 
cooled 
adsorber 
Adsorber Original More pressure loss of vacuum Liquid/vapor 
deviation of decomposition 
More Pressure initiated by high 
fromADl temperature 
adsorber Original More pressure air leakage Autoignitionldeflagr 
deviation of into equipment ation of vapor 
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More Pressure operating 
fromADl under vacuum 
ITEM CONNECTING ORIGINAL DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES 
EQUIPMENT DEVIATION 
Com pres From equipment Original More pressure Failure of excessive 
sor ADl Pipe 3 deviation of control or temperature I 
More Pressure closure of mechanical damage I 
fromADl downstream exothermic 
block valve, or decomposition of 
failure to fluid I ignition of 
remove blind, fluid if shock 
or plugged sensitive 
outlet which 
deadheads 
pump 
Compres From equipment Original More pressure Compressor mechanical damage 
sor ADl Pipe 3 deviation of used for higher 
More Pressure than design 
fromADl density fluid 
service 
especially 
during startup 
and upset 
conditions 
Compres From equipment Original More pressure Leakage on flammable 
sor ADI Pipe 3 deviation of suction side of atmosphere 
More Pressure compressor 
fromADl pulls air into 
system 
Compres From equipment Original More pressure Exothermic mechanical damage 
sor ADI Pipe 3 deviation of decomposition 
More Pressure of compressed 
fromADl fluid (e.g., 
ace:trlene) 
ITEM CONNECTING ORIGINAL DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES 
EQUIPMENT DEVIATION 
Blower From equipment Original More Pressure Leakage on flammable 
COl Pipe4 deviation of suction side of atmosphere 
More Pressure compressor 
fromADl pulls air into 
system 
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CHAPTER- 5 
CASE STUDY 
5.1 PROCESS DESCRIPTION 
This process is originally proposed by Lapp and Powers (1977) and 
subsequently used by Wang (2004) in his doctoral thesis. It describes a cooling 
process of hot nitric acid. The nitric acid as shown in Figure 5.1 is sent to the 
reactor to combine with Benzene to form Nitrobenzene. The water flowing 
through the pump is used to cool and control the temperature of the hot nitric 
acid through the heat exchanger. After sensing the temperature, the temperature 
controller sends a signal to valve2 so as to minimize water flow. This would keep 
the hot nitric at a desired temperature. 
Valvel (VI) 
L..-------, 
ve2 (V2) 
Temperature (TS) 
Sensor 
Reactor 
~-+-- __ JZ'SJ Temperature (TC) lSZI Controller 
Figure 5.1: Process facility for Nitric Acid Cooling 
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5.2 EQUIPMENT FUNCTIONS 
The functions of each of the equipment are described below. 
1) Valve1 (V1 ): Regulates the flow of hot nitric acid into the heat exchanger. 
2) Pump (PU): Maintains the circulation of water and supplies the water to the 
heat exchanger. 
3) Heat Exchanger (HE): Lowers the temperature of the hot nitric acid using the 
water supplied by the pump. 
4) Valve2 (V2): Regulates the flow of water entering the heat exchanger from the 
pump. 
5) Temperature Sensor (TS): Detects the temperature of the nitric acid and 
sends a signal to the temperature controller if the desired temperature is not 
maintained. 
6) Temperature Controller (TC): Controls the flow of water entering the heat 
exchanger by sensing the temperature from the temperature sensor and shifting 
the position of valve2 accordingly. 
7) Reactor (REA): Assists the reaction between nitric acid and benzene to obtain 
nitrobenzene. The reaction must take place at a specified temperature and 
pressure. High temperature or pressure in the nitric acid reactor feed could cause 
a reactor runaway. 
The control of temperature of hot nitric acid is required in order to run the 
process facility within safe limits. Due to this requirement, the process facility will 
be analyzed by investigating the effect of the process variable deviation "MORE 
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TEMPERATURE". The end result will show the causes and consequences of the 
propagation of "MORE TEMPERATURE", and how it affects equipment. 
;~~A#~~~~~A~---~-~A·····--~~-~·--~·········-~~--~~·-······-····~·······~·-· 
' 
Figure: 5.2: P&ID diagram with HAZOP analysis dialogue box in 
the Graphical User Interface. 
5.3 ExpHAZOP+ ANALYSIS OF THE NITRIC ACID COOLING 
The steps taken for HAZOP analysis by ExpHAZOP+ as described in Chapter 4 
are given below: 
1) Development of P&ID diagram: The P&ID diagram is drawn in the Graphical 
user interface. The P&ID consists of all the equipment described above. The 
connecting pipelines are shown by arrows which indicate the direction of the hot 
nitric acid flow from valve1 through the heat exchanger towards the reactor. The 
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equipment diagram is preloaded into the menu buttons. The P&ID drawn in the 
graphical user interface is shown in Figure 5.2. 
2) Selection of process general and process specific equipment: 
In this case study the equipment and their related data are already pre-loaded to 
perform the analysis. Hence the approach taken here is process generic. 
3) Selection of a study node: 
The study node in this case is selected based on the process operation. The 
purpose of the process is to cool down the hot nitric acid before the nitric acid 
enters the reactor. Thus all equipment starting from valve1 up to and including 
the reactor are selected as the study node. 
4) Creation of data structure: 
All the equipment and their connecting paths are loaded in the data structure as 
described in Chapter 4. 
5) Performing HAZOP analysis on selected path: 
The HAZOP analysis is performed by pressing the "begin HAZOP analysis" 
button. The starting and ending equipment are selected. The deviation "MORE 
TEMPERATURE" is also selected. The HAZOP analysis is then performed from 
the starting to the ending equipment. 
6) Selection of the path for HAZOP analysis: 
The only possible path for HAZOP analysis in this approach is the pipeline 
entering from valve1, through the heat exchanger and towards the reactor. Thus 
this path is chosen for HAZOP analysis. 
7) Report Generation: Table 5.1 shows the result of the HAZOP analysis. 
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Table 5.1: Result ofExpHAZOP+ analysis for the nitric acid cooling process 
ITEM CONNECTING ORIGINAL DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES 
EQUIPMENT DEVIATION 
valve I Original More too hot flow rate increases 
deviation of tempemture supply of 
More nitric acid 
Tempemture 
from VI 
valve I Original More valvei stuck heat exchanger 
deviation of tempemture temperature increase 
More 
Tempemture 
from VI 
ITEM CONNECTING ORIGINAL DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES 
EQUIPMENT DEVIATION 
Heat From equipment Original More internal Too hot reactor 
exchanger VI Pipe 4 deviation of tempemture fouling 
More occurs 
Tempemture 
from VI 
Heat From equipment Original More large Excess flow from 
exchanger VI Pipe 4 deviation of tempemture external pump 
More tempemture 
Tempemture 
from VI 
Heat From equipment Original More external fire Tempemture sensor 
exchanger VI Pipe 4 deviation of tempemture failure 
More 
Tempemture 
from Vl 
Heat From equipment Original More valve2 stuck Temperature control 
exchanger Vl Pipe 4 deviation of tempemture failure 
More 
Temperature 
from Vl 
ITEM CONNECTING ORIGINAL DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES 
EQUIP DEVIATION 
Tempemtur From equipment Original More sense high temperature in 
e sensor HE Pipe 8 deviation of tempemture improperly tempemture cooler 
More 
Temperature 
from Vl 
Tempemtur From equipment Original More tempemture improper cooling 
e sensor HE Pipe 8 deviation of tempemture sensor stuck 
More 
Temperature 
from Vl 
Tempemtur From equipment Original More tempemture pump load increase 
e sensor HE Pipe 8 deviation of tempemture sensor fails 
More 
Temperature 
from Vl 
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ITEM CONNECTING ORIGINAL DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES 
EQUIPMENT DEVIATION 
Reactor From equipment Original More heat reaction temperature 
TS Pipe 10 deviation of temperature exchanger increase 
More failure 
Temperature 
from V1 
Reactor From equipment Original More hot nitric reactor runaway 
TS Pipe 10 deviation of temperature acid flowing 
More 
Temperature 
from V1 
Reactor From equipment Original More pump failure reactor rupture 
TS Pipe 10 deviation of temperature 
More 
Temperature 
from Vl 
Reactor From equipment Original More temperature exceed design 
TS Pipe 10 deviation of temperature sensor I temperature and 
More controller pressure 
Temperature failure 
from V1 
5.4 COMPARISION OF WANG (2004) AND EXPHAZOP+ 
In Lapp and Powers ( 1977) and Wang (2004 ), the nitric acid process 
facility was analyzed using a fault tree to identify possible failures. One of the 
undesired events that led to an accident in both processes was the entering of 
hot nitric acid into the reactor. The fault tree analysis (FTA) of their case study 
revealed the basic cause leading to this accident in terms of minimal cutsets 
(shortest route leading to an accident) of the tree. The HAZOP study procedure 
identifies the causes and consequences for possible failures in a process facility. 
The output of ExpHAZOP+, shown in Table 5.1, gives the possible causes and 
consequences as a result of high temperature in the reactor feed. Table 5.2 
below shows a comparative analysis of Wang's approach using FTA and 
ExpHAZOP+ using HAZOP analysis. 
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Table 5.2: Comparative analysis between Wang and ExpHAZOP+ 
Approach Identified basic cause leading to an undesired event as a result of 
the deviation, "MORE TEMPERATURE". 
Wang V1 ->HE-> TS 
(FTA) TS failure 
TC failure 
Large External Fire 
ExpHAZOP+ *V1 ->HE-> TS 
(HAZOP) TS failure 
TC failure 
Large External Fire 
*Wang defined temperature deviation as +1 0°C. 
In ExpHAZOP+, the hazard and its causes and consequences is identified by the 
deviation "MORE TEMPERATURE". Conversely in Wang, starting from the 
deviation, "MORE TEMPERATURE", the basic paths (combination of a group of 
basic event causes) are identified based for that deviation. Table 5.2 shows that 
the identified causes and consequences in ExpHAZOP+ are identical to the basic 
events obtained by Wang. 
Table 5.1 shows that an increase in temperature in valve1 causes an 
increase in flow rate of nitric acid. It also causes a rise in temperature in the heat 
exchanger. An increase in temperature at the heat exchanger causes an 
increase in water flow from the pump which in turn causes the failure of the 
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temperature sensor and temperature controller. This failure results in the 
improper cooling of hot nitric acid. As a result of improper cooling the hot nitric 
acid entering the reactor can cause one of the following hazards in the reactor: 
a) Increase in reaction temperature, b) reactor runaway, c) reactor rupture and d) 
an exceeding of design temperature and pressure. 
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CHAPTER 6: 
CONCLUSION 
This work was mainly focused on the development of an expert tool for 
automated HAZOP analysis. It discusses a new way of identifying hazard in 
process facilities. This approach identifies all downstream equipment and 
demonstrates the propagation of deviation in the case study. The result of 
ExpHAZOP+ analysis matches the result of Wang's (2004) approach. Wang's 
FT A tool identifies all possible paths that lead hot nitric flow to the reactor based 
on different deviations (e.g. pressure, flow etc.). ExpHAZOP+ identifies one such 
path by applying the deviation, "MORE TEMPERATURE". In ExpHAZOP+ if the 
database is updated for pressure, flow deviations etc. then it would also identify 
other possible causes and consequences as described in Wang's FTA approach. 
The limitation in Wang's approach is that the causes and consequences of the 
deviation, "MORE TEMPERATURE" only identify the reasons of the reactor 
failure. ExpHAZOP+ extends this by identifying this particular deviation can affect 
the reactor as well as other equipment before the propagation ends up in the 
reactor. 
The following features were integrated in the ExpHAZOP+ as an improvement to 
previous expert tools described in Chapter 2. 
1) Enhanced graphical user interface with user-friendly tools to perform 
automated HAZOP analysis. 
2) User generated Knowledge-base allowing easy interface to add data. 
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3) Identification of propagation of deviation to all downstream units. 
ExpHAZOP+ is the first step taken toward a new way to identify deviation 
in a process facility. Future enhancement can add the following in ExpHAZOP+: 
1) Development of a relationship between causes and consequences. 
2) Find the propagation of different of kind of deviation among equipment (e.g. 
How "MORE TEMPERATURE" in one equipment causes MORE PRESSURE in 
another equipment and identify the deviations of such). 
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Introduction 
HAZOP (HAZard and Operability) is defined as the application of a formal, 
systematic, critical rigorous examination to the process facility and engineering 
intentions of new and existing facilities to access the hazard potential of mal-
operation or mal-function of individual items or equipments and the consequential 
effects of the facility as a whole. HAZOP can be used but not limited to identify 
the risks involved in a chemical plant. Towards this goal an automated tool 
ExpHAZOP+ is developed to identify the risks involved with its unique fault 
propagation approach. 
System Requirements 
The following system specifications are required before ExpHAZOP+ can be 
installed and used. 
System: Minimum Pentium 11-compatible, 300 Mhz. 
Operating System: Windows 2000 or XP. 
Memory: 256 MB 
Disk Space: A minimum of 12 MB. 
Display: Any display that runs under windows OS. 
Printer (optional): Required if the result of the HAZOP report is printed. 
Additional Software: Microsoft Word, Microsoft Access ODBC driver. 
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Setup and Installation 
This instruction file contains information to run ExpHAZOP+. This includes setting 
up the files, copying some folders to a destination directory, menu helps as well 
as installing the software in your computer. 
Installation of ExpHAZOP+ 
The installation procedure of ExpHAZOP requires the following steps: (This 
would allow ExpHAZOP+ to run in your computer on a windows based platform). 
1) Click on the "setup" file from your CD drive. 
2) A new screen will appear. Click "OK". 
3) In this step another screen will appear which would offer you're a choice of 
installing the software in a specified directory. Indicate the directory where you 
want to set up ExpHAZOP+. Otherwise choose "Click this button to install 
ExpHAZOP+ software to the specified destination directory" and ExpHAZOP+ 
will be installed in your C drive. 
4) Click "Continue" in this step. 
5) The required files will now be copied in the destination folder. Once all the files 
are copied click "OK" to complete the installation process. 
Setup of ExpHAZOP+ 
Once the installation procedure is complete, please copy the following files into 
your hard drive as follows: 
1) Create a directory "ExpHAZOP" in your C drive if none exists. 
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2) Copy and Paste the folders "Database" and "JPEG" from the installation CD to 
the above created directory "ExpHAZOP" in the C drive. 
ExpHAZOP+ is now ready to run. 
Features of ExpHAZOP+ 
ExpHAZOP+ consists of the following three features described as follows: 
GRAPHICAL USER INTERFACE (GUI) 
The graphical user interface allows the user to perform HAZOP analysis by 
drawing P&ID diagram using existing equipments or his own defined equipment. 
It further allows the user to perform some general functions such as saving and 
opening a particular P&ID, adding captions to equipments and lines for 
identification, etc. 
INFERENCE ENGINE 
The inference engine acts as a search engine which searches for the 
occurrence of a particular deviation in all the databases for all the equipments. 
REPORT GENERATOR 
The report generator displays the output generated as a result of the user 
input given in the graphical user interface and the search performed in the 
inference engine. The output is displayed in an MS formatted document which 
can be printed if required. 
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HAZOP Overview 
This section briefly describes HAZOP, its purpose, the method that has 
been applied in aspect of ExpHAZOP+ and the relevant terminologies. 
HAZOP is one of the most common tools to accomplish hazard 
assessment. The purpose of HAZOP is to reduce risks involved in a chemical 
plant and identify the causes and consequences of the risks involved. Manual 
HAZOP is expensive due to its high manpower cost and prolonged time. The 
purpose of automated HAZOP analysis is to reduce the time required in manual 
HAZOP analysis and act as an aid in the actual analysis. 
ExpHAZOP+APPROACH 
Towards this goal ExpHAZOP+ is developed with a unique fault 
propagation approach to identify hazard, its causes and consequences. The 
approach is described below: 
The fault propagation algorithm consists of the following steps: 
1) Identify equipments based on their operations. 
2) Select the study node to perform HAZOP analysis. 
3) Identify the starting and ending equipment 
4) Select the deviation for the starting equipment 
5) Determine if the deviation is related to process generic operation 
6) Apply propagation method to identify general causes and consequences. 
7) Determine if the deviation is related to process specific operation 
8) Apply propagation method to identify specific causes and consequences. 
9) Move to the next equipment. 
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1 0) End the search if this is the last equipment. Otherwise repeat the 
procedure from step 3 - 8. 
HAZOP TERMINOLOGIES 
Some of the common terminologies associated with HAZOP study are described 
below: 
Piping and Instrumentation diagram (P&ID): A detailed map of the entire 
process facility covering each and every vessel, conduit, valve, and all equipment 
employed in the process line. 
Study Node: Any unit of the process facility within the P&ID diagram which is 
under HAZOP study. 
Process Variable: The variables within the process facility which operates the 
facility. Typical process variables are temperature, pressure, flow etc. 
Guide Words: Helps to identify and categorize certain deviation in the process 
plant. Typical guide words used in HAZOP study are MORE, LESS, NO etc. 
Process Variable Deviation: The combination of a guide word and a process 
variable which makes a meaningful deviation. Example of process variable 
deviations are MORE TEMPERATURE, LESS PRESSURE etc. 
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Features of ExpHAZOP+ System 
MENU FEATURES 
The menus are organized as follows 
1) File: Consists of general operations for files. 
• Open: Opens an existing ExpHAZOP+ file. 
• Save: Saves a current ExpHAZOP+ files. The files have ".tzr" extension. 
• Exit: Exits ExpHAZOP+ software. 
2) Study Envelope: Selects and deselects a study node under HAZOP analysis. 
• Mark Study Node: Selects a study node for HAZOP analysis. 
• Remove Study Node: Deselects a study node once analysis is complete. 
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3) Equipment Operations: Consists connecting, disconnecting and removal of 
equipment and also adds caption to the connecting pipeline which connects two 
equipments. 
• Add User Equipment: Adds user equipment depending on the process 
facility. The user has to enter the equipment name, deviations, causes and 
consequences. There will be a prompt from the GUI which will allow the 
user to add his own data. All data will then be updated in the Access 
Database in table format. 
• Remove Equipment: Removes the currently selected equipment. 
• Connect Equipment: Connects two equipments. The two equipments 
have to be selected in order to make a valid connection. The direction of 
connection is the order to equipment selection i.e. if two equipments are 
selected then the direction of deviation is from the first selected equipment 
to the second selected equipment. 
• Disconnect Equipment: Removes the connection between two 
equipments. Two equipments have to be selected to make a 
disconnection. 
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• Caption to Line: Allows user to add a caption to the pipeline connecting 
two equipments. Two equipments must be selected in order to add the 
caption to the connecting pipeline. Caption to line is optional in this 
HAZOP study. 
4) Analysis: Operations related to HAZOP analysis (described in detailed in the 
next section). 
TOOLBAR BUTTON FEATURES 
The toolbar consists of icons (toolbar buttons) representing equipments. It also 
consist option for connecting, disconnecting and removing equipments already in 
the menu button added for the convenience of the user. Each toolbar button 
consists of a tool tip text which shows the name of each equipment. 
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STEPS FOR HAZOP ANALYSIS 
The first step for HAZOP analysis is the drawing of P&ID. This varies from 
plant to plant. The user can draw the P&ID according to his needs. The diagram 
below shows the ExpHAZOP+ software with one possible P&ID. 
CF 
Once the drawing of P&ID is completed the next step is to draw a study node. 
The study node can be any particular equipment or the entire P&ID. In this 
case due to the small number of equipments the entire P&ID is selected as 
the study node. The study node is drawn using "Mark Study Node" under 
"Study Envelope" Menu. This would allow the user to perform HAZOP 
analysis once the study node is selected. The user can now begin the 
HAZOP analysis by selecting the "Start HAZOP analysis" under the "Analysis" 
Menu. A new window will open with the heading "HAZOP ANALYSIS". 
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In this window, all the equipments entered in the P&ID selected by the 
study node will automatically enter the drop down menu in the starting and 
ending equipment. The starting equipment is the beginning point of HAZOP 
analysis in the study node. The ending equipment is the ending point of analysis 
in the study node. The deviation is the chosen deviation in which the HAZOP 
analysis is performed. In the example above for the given P&ID and the study 
node (dotted rectangular line) the starting equipment is "blower" (with caption 
"BL") and the ending equipment is Air Cooled Exchanger (with caption "ACE"). All 
input must be entered in order to make valid HAZOP analysis. An error message 
would generate otherwise. 
Once the input and output equipment is selected another window appears. 
Based on the P&ID diagram and the starting and ending equipment, this window 
finds all the different possible connectivity between the starting and ending point 
will present the user different options for connection between the input equipment 
and output equipment. For the above example the different possible paths to 
perform HAZOP analysis is shown below. 
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In the example above for the given input the user has to select one of the two 
paths to perform HAZOP analysis. The connection paths are derived from the 
P&ID diagram drawn by the user. In the above analysis the user selects the first 
path ("BL 1 AD 4 ACE'?. The numbers 1 and 4 represents the pipelines 
connected between the equipments. Upon selected the user performs HAZOP 
analysis on the selected path. This outputs the result of the HAZOP as follows in 
this example: 
ITEM CONNECTING ORIGINAL DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES 
EQUIPMENT DEVIATION 
blower Original More Leakage on flammable 
deviation of Pressure suction atmosphere 
More side of 
Pressure compressor 
from BL pulls air 
into system 
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ITEM CONNECTING ORIGINAL DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES 
EQUIPMENT DEVIATION 
adsorber From equipment Original More Migration of blockages I rupture 
BL Pipe 1 deviation of pressure internals 
More into lines 
Pressure 
from BL 
adsorber From equipment Original More Blockage of rupture 
BL Pipe 1 deviation of pressure packing I 
More trays 
Pressure 
from BL 
adsorber From equipment Original More Process vaporization of the 
BL Pipe 1 deviation of pressure liquid process liquid 
More reintroduce 
Pressure d into 
from BL improperly 
cooled 
adsorber 
adsorber From equipment Original More loss of Liquid/vapor 
BL Pipe 1 deviation of pressure vacuum decomposition 
More initiated by high 
Pressure temperature 
from BL 
adsorber From equipment Original More air leakage Autoignition/deflagra 
BL Pipe 1 deviation of pressure into tion of vapor 
More equipment 
Pressure operating 
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from BL under 
vacuum 
ITEM CONNECTING ORIGINAL DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES 
EQUIPMENT DEVIATION 
Air From equipment Original More Corrosionle heat transfer surface 
cooled AD Pipe 4 deviation of pressure rosion of leak or rupture and 
exchang More exchanger possible 
ers Pressure internals overpressure of the 
from BL low pressure side 
Air From equipment Original More Excessive vaporization of the 
cooled AD Pipe 4 deviation of pressure heat input cold-side fluid (e.g., 
exchang More control system 
ers Pressure failure, cold-side 
from BL blocked in) 
Air From equipment Original More fouling, Loss of heat transfer 
cooled AD Pipe 4 deviation of pressure accumulati capability I higher 
exchang More on of non- tube wall 
ers Pressure condensabl temperatures I 
from BL es, or loss overheating of 
of cooling reactive material I 
medium loss of tube strength 
from I excessive 
condensing differential thermal 
side expansion 
Air From equipment Original More Cold-side overheating 
cooled AD Pipe 4 deviation of pressure fluid 
exchang More blocked in 
ers Pressure while 
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from BL heating 
medium 
continues 
to flow 
Air From equipment Original More Ambient higher vaporization 
cooled AD Pipe 4 deviation of pressure temperatur rate in air heated 
exchang More e increase exchanger 
ers Pressure 
from BL 
EQUIPMENT DATABASE 
The current database contains data for 19 different pieces of equipment 
related to the process facility. The equipment are: adsorber, air cooled 
exchanger, blower, carbon block exchanger, centrifuge, compressor, cyclone, 
distillation column, dust collector, electrostatic precipitator, extractor, filter heat 
exchanger, piping, pump, reactor, temperature sensor, temperature controller 
and valve. The equipment data table for adsorber and air cooled exchanger are 
given below: 
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5 
6: 
• hot spots and fire 
or excessive • compositions outside of 
• metallurgical limits (e.g., 
vapor flow 
.............. ....... .... 1(): 
igh concentration of . 11 ~ 
ammables in the inlet stream ; 
a carbon bed adsorber 
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ling, accumulation of 
n-condensables, or 
oss of cooling medium 
condensing side 
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misalignment or 
entrance of foreign 
ects 
impact with fan blade 
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APPENDIX II: ExpHAZOP+ Specification 
ExpHAZOP+ is developed using Visual Basic 6.0. In order to run this code 
one must have Visual Basic 6.0. Also the following folders must be present if not 
if can be copied from the CD attached with this document. The folders are: 
C:\ExpHAZOP\JPEG\: consist a list of equipment images used to run this 
program 
C:\ExpHAZOP\Database\equipmentdata.mdb: consists of a list of equipment 
data table. 
In order to run the code click on the following Visual Basic Project: Project1 
The code is separated into the following forms, modules and class module: 
Forms: Form1.frm, Form2.frm and Form3.frm. 
Class: cBiock.cls, cline.cls, myBiockCollection.cls, myLineCollection.cls, 
trigofunc.bas. 
The forms and classes along with its member functions are described below: 
Form1.frm 
Form1 consist general functions such as toolbar properties, file properties, 
scrollbar properties, GUI mouse properties, equipment mouse properties, 
checking if certain equipment is inside a study node etc. Form1.frm also allows 
user the draw the Process and Instrumentation Diagram (P&ID) for HAZOP 
analysis. Each function in Form1.frm is described below: 
FORM OPERATIONS 
Private Sub Form_Load() 
Loads the default values and variables in a form once it is loaded. 
Private Sub Form_Unload(Cancel As Integer) 
Unloads the contents of the form once the cancel ("X") button is pressed. 
Private Sub Toolbar1_ButtonCiick(ByVal Button As MSComctllib.Button) 
Toolbar1 describes the features in a toolbar and activates once the toolbar 
button has been clicked. Toolbar1 has features to add an equipment, 
remove and equipment, connect two equipments and disconnect two 
equipments. 
Private Sub Picture1_MouseDown(Button As Integer, Shift As Integer, X As 
Single, y As Single) 
Activates the MouseDown control of the Graphical User Interface (GUI). 
Private Sub Picture1_MouseMove(Button As Integer, Shift As Integer, X As 
Single, y As Single) 
Activates the MouseMove control of the Graphical User Interface (GUI). 
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Private Sub Picture1_MouseUp(Button As Integer, Shift As Integer, X As 
Single, y As Single) 
Activates the MouseUp control of the Graphical User Interface (GUI). 
Private Sub picid_MouseDown(lndex As Integer, Button As Integer, Shift As 
Integer, X As Single, y As Single) 
Activates the MouseDown control of the an equipment in the Graphical 
User Interface (GUI). 
Private Sub picid_MouseMove(lndex As Integer, Button As Integer, Shift As 
Integer, X As Single, y As Single) 
Activates the MouseMove control of the an equipment in the Graphical 
User Interface (GUI). 
Private Sub picid_MouseUp(lndex As Integer, Button As Integer, Shift As 
Integer, X As Single, y As Single) 
Activates the MouseUp control of the an equipment in the Graphical User 
Interface (GUI). 
FILE OPERATIONS 
Private Sub mnuOpen_Ciick() 
Opens a previously saved ExpHAZOP file with . tzr extension. 
Private Sub load_FILE(sFILE As String) 
Loads an existing ExpHAZOP file with .tzr extension in the GUI. 
Private Sub mnuSave_Ciick() 
Saves the current content of the GUI in a file with .tzr extension. 
Private Sub mnuExit_Ciick() 
Exits the ExpHAZOP+ application. 
STUDY NODE OPERATIONS 
Private Sub mnumarkstudynode_Ciick() 
Marks a study node in the GUI. 
Private Sub mnuremstudynode_Ciick() 
Unmarks a study node in the GUI. 
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EQUIPMENT OPERATIONS 
Private Sub mnuusrequip() 
Adds a user defined equipment. 
Private Sub mnuconequip_Ciick() 
Connects two equipments in the GUI. 
Private Sub mnudisconequip_Ciick() 
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Removes the connection between two equipment objects. 
Private Sub mnuCaptoline_Ciick() 
Adds a caption to the connecting line between two equipments. 
Public Sub CaptiontoShape() 
Adds caption to an equipment. 
Private Sub mnustartanalysis_Ciick() 
Analyze the current contents of a study node. 
Private Function CheckifContainedline(aControl As Control) As Boolean 
Checks if a certain connecting line object lies inside a study node. 
Private Function CheckifContainedShape(aControl As Control) As Boolean 
Checks if a certain equipment lies inside a study node. 
Private Sub DrawShape() 
Marks a study node. 
Sub AlignScroiiBars(), Private Sub Form_Resize(), Private Sub 
HScroll_ Change(), Private Sub VScroll_ Change() 
The following functions are used to change and control the properties of 
the scrollbars. 
Public Function GetFirst() As Integer 
Determines whether one or more equipment has been entered in the 
study node. 
Private Sub Storeid(idindex As Integer, j As Integer) 
Stores the id of the equipment entered in the GUI in an array. 
Public Function Retrieveld(j As Integer) As String 
Retrieves the id of the equipment entered in the GUI from the stored array. 
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Public Sub lnputOutput(inputid As Integer, outputid As Integer) 
Identifies and retrieves the id of the first and last equipment in the study 
node. 
Form3.frm 
Form3.frm takes all the input including the starting equipment, the ending 
equipment and the deviation for HAZOP analysis once the study node is drawn. 
It consists of the following functions. 
Private Sub Form_Load() 
Loads the default contents and variables of Form3.frm. 
Private Sub Form_Unload(Cancel As Integer) 
Unloads the contents of Form3.frm once the form exits. 
Private Sub cmdAnalysis_Ciick() 
This function initiates HAZOP analysis once all inputs in the input form are 
entered. 
Public Sub SetConnection() 
Calls the function FindConnection, TrinRow and AddArraytoCombo. 
Private Sub FindConnection() 
This function identifies all connection of all equipments inside the study 
node from the starting equipment given by the user. 
Private Sub TrimRow() 
This function removes the equipments which are connected to the first 
equipment but not the last. 
Public Sub AddArraytoCombo() 
The function below adds the equipments and the connecting pipe to the 
combo box from the anarrayRow. This gives the user using the system to 
identify which 
path should he choose for HAZOP analysis. 
Private Function itemexists(temparray() As Variant) As Boolean 
This function identifies if an item exists in the temparray. 
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Form4.frm 
Form4.frm gives user an option to choose a certain path for HAZOP 
analysis. Once the user selects the path the output for that HAZOP analysis is 
given in a Microsoft Word file. The functions in Form4.frm are as follows: 
Private Sub Form_Load() 
Loads the default contents and variables of Form3.frm. 
Private Sub Form_Unload(Cancel As Integer) 
Unloads the contents of Form3.frm once the form exits. 
Private Sub cmdPerformAnalysis_Ciick() 
This function performs a HAZOP analysis on a path selected by the user. 
Sub ReportGenerator(strltem As String, strConnection As String, 
strOrigDeviation As String, strDeviation As String, strCause As String, 
strConsequence As String, occur As Integer) 
This function generates the output in Microsoft Word of the user query. 
The output is shown in a tabular format. The output shows the propagation 
of deviation from the first equipment to the last equipment. 
Trigofunc.bas 
Trigofunc.bas computes the trigonometric functions required in the project. 
Public Function Arcsin(X As Double) As Double 
The function Arcsin computes the inverse of sine. 
Public Function Arccos(X As Double) As Double 
The function Arccos computes the inverse of cosine. 
cBiock.cls 
This class module consists of setting and storing of individual equipment 
properties. It consists of the following class members. 
Public Property Let TagiD(ByVal vData As String) 
Stores the tag assigned to equipment. 
Public Property Get TagiD() As String 
Retrieves the tag assigned to equipment. 
Public Property Let shapeHeight(ByVal vData As Integer) 
Stores the height assigned to equipment. 
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Public Property Get shapeHeight() As Integer 
Retrieves the height assigned to equipment. 
Public Property Let shapeWidth(ByVal vData As Integer) 
Stores the width assigned to equipment. 
Public Property Get shapeWidth() As Integer 
Retrieves the width assigned to equipment. 
Public Property Let sCaptionUpper(ByVal vData As String) 
Stores the caption of assigned to equipment. 
Public Property Get sCaptionUpper() As String 
Retrieves the caption assigned to equipment. 
Public Property Let Visible(ByVal vData As Boolean) 
Stores the visibility property assigned to equipment. 
Public Property Get Visible() As Boolean 
Retrieves the visibility property assigned to equipment. 
Public Property Let shapeLeft(ByVal vData As Double) 
Stores the coordinate of the left edge of the equipment. 
Public Property Get shapeLeft() As Double 
Retrieves the coordinate of the left edge of the equipment. 
Public Property Let shapeTop(ByVal vData As Double) 
Stores the coordinate of the Top edge of the equipment. 
Public Property Get shapeTop() As Double 
Retrieves the coordinate of the Top edge of the equipment. 
Public Sub updateShapeCaptionPos() 
Updates the position of the Caption of equipments. 
myBiockCollections.cls 
This class represents a collection of equipments which are entered in the 
Graphical User Interface. Its member functions are follows: 
Public Function AddShape(PICTYPE As Integer, sKey As String) As cBiock 
This function adds equipment in the GUI and sets the properties of the 
equipment such as its width, height, name, starting position etc. 
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Public Property Get ltem(vntlndexKey As Variant) As cBiock 
This function is used when referencing an equipment element in the 
collection vntlndexKey contains either the Index or Key to the collection. A 
collection is a data structure where equipments are added. 
Public Property Get Count() As Long 
Counts the number of elements in the collection. 
Public Sub Remove(vntlndexKey As Variant) 
Removes an element from a collection. 
Private Sub Class_lnitialize() 
Creates the collection when this class is created. 
Private Sub Class_ Terminate() 
Destroys collection when this class is terminated. 
Public Sub removeShape(lndex As Integer) 
This function removes currently selected equipment. 
Public Function getFreeTagiD() As String 
This function assigns a unique id to each equipment. 
Public Function getlndexFromTag(sTag As String) As Integer 
This functions extracts the index number from the tag of an equipment. 
cline.cls 
This class represents the contents of a connected line and its properties 
such as its caption, tagid of the source and destination equipment it is connected. 
Its member functions are defined below: 
Public Property Let sCaption(ByVal vData As String) 
Stores the caption of a connected line. 
Public Property Get sCaption() As String 
Retrieves the caption of a connected line. 
Public Property Let bShowArrow(ByVal vData As Boolean) 
Stores the contents of the arrowhead of a connected line. 
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Public Property Get bShowArrow() As Boolean 
Retrieves the content of the arrowhead of a connected line. 
Public Property Let sFrom(ByVal vData As String) 
Stores the tag id of the source equipment of a connected line. 
Public Property Get sFrom() As String 
Retrieves the tag id of the source equipment of a connected line. 
Public Property Let sTo(ByVal vData As String) 
Stores the tag id of the destination equipment of a connected line. 
Public Property Get sTo() As String 
Retrieves the tag id of the destination equipment of a connected line. 
Public Property Let sFromCap(ByVal vData As String) 
Stores the caption of the source equipment of a connected line. 
Public Property Get sFromCap() As String 
Retrieves the caption of the source equipment of a connected line. 
Public Property Let sToCap(ByVal vData As String) 
Stores the caption of the destination equipment of a connected line. 
Public Property Get sToCap() As String 
Retrieves the caption of the destination equipment of a connected line. 
myli neCollections.cls 
This class represents a collection of lines connecting two equipments 
which are entered in the Graphical User Interface. Its member functions are 
follows: 
Public Function Addline(sFrom As String, sTo As String, bShowArrow As 
Boolean, Optional sKey As String) As cline 
Adds a new connecting line between two equipments. Stores line 
properties such as its coordinates, source equipment id, destination 
equipment id etc. 
Public Property Get ltem(vntlndexKey As Variant) As cline 
This function is used when referencing a line element in the collection 
vntlndexKey contains either the Index or Key to the collection. A collection 
is a data structure where equipments are added. 
Public Function StoreCollectionltemsinArray(itemarray() As Integer, 
equiptag As Integer) As Variant 
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This function stores the entire equipment item and the connected lines in a 
two dimensional array mArray from the collection object mCol. 
Public Property Get Count() As Long 
Counts the number of elements in the collection. 
Public Sub Remove(vntlndexKey As Variant) 
Removes an element from a collection. 
Private Sub Class_lnitialize() 
Creates the collection when this class is created. 
Private Sub Class_ Terminate() 
Destroys collection when this class is terminated. 
Public Sub deleteline(xFrom As Integer, xTo As Integer) 
This function deletes a connected line. 
Public Sub updatelines() 
This function updates the coordinates of the connected lines every time an 
equipment item is moved. 
Public Sub AddCaptionToline(sFrom As String, sTo As String, sCaption As 
String) 
This function adds a caption to a line 
Public Sub showArrow(lineObj As Line, arrowTo As String) 
This function is called in update line and updates the position of the 
arrowhead each time the arrows are moved. 
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